Defending China from the Shores of . . . CHINA
I think the op-ed of the day is Kissinger’s latest apologia on behalf of the Chinese. Let’s get the standard disclaimers out of the way, as Kissinger himself does: The Chinese have made Kissinger a boatload of money, and continue to. He has a vested interest in minimizing their appalling human rights record and in keeping US-China tensions low. What rings true about the article, though, is Kissinger’s construction of China’s grand strategy: patience. And that got me thinking about great-power grand strategy in general.
Kissinger’s argument is, basically, you don’t need to “contain” China in the sense we contained the Soviet Union because China is not an expansive power. China wants Taiwan “back,” just as the Chinese elite on Taiwan want the mainland “back,” but they sure are taking their time about it. China conquered Tibet, but apparently with the mindset that it was really Chinese in the first place. They have not troubled to conquer Nepal, Bhutan or Mongolia. They fought the US in Korea, but only when the American Army approached the Yalu – after driving the UN forces back in the vicinity of the 38th parallel, they accepted a negotiated settlement. They’ve fought border wars with India, Vietnam and the Soviet Union, but in each case the issues were small, the battles short, the result: status quo. They maintain no overseas bases and are only now thinking semi-seriously about building an ocean-going navy. Their logistical ability to project power beyond their borders is minimal. The possibility of China moving 100,000-thousand-plus men across eight time zones to topple a foreign regime and administer the territory? It is to laugh.
In other words, China has followed a national security strategy equivalent to the “defending the country on the beaches of Santa Monica” option that Virginia Postrel among others considers self-evidently absurd for the United States.
But it works for them. Keep in mind that the PRC regime is stunningly inhumane and and has in my lifetime been murderously so. But it has, through prudent foreign policy and cautious military deployments, been able to maintain its independence and secure its borders for decades. It is now a rising commercial power. Think what they might already be with better governance.
Meanwhile, the US and Soviet Union, the other two great powers of the second half of the Twentieth Century, took entirely different tacks. Like the US, the Soviets chose a “forward strategy of defense.” They established bases from Havana to Haiphong. They anchored in Somalia, then swapped it for Ethiopia. They built a great warm-water navy. They occupied a buffer zone of countries to their west and kept them weak and compliant. Sometimes the violence was subtle; others, showy. They propped up friendly regimes in Africa, Latin America and Asia. They taught the Egyptian Air Force how to fly and, when necesary, flew for them. Out of whatever combination of defensive and expansive motives they conquered Afghanistan and tried to modernize it (along Soviet lines).
And it all came crashing down within fifty years. Imperial overstretch. Bad governance at home too, though in the period we’re talking about, the CCCP killed many fewer of its own citizens than the Chinese Communist Party killed of its own. But, by and large, the Soviets grand strategy was our grand strategy. Ironically, Trotsky really did win the argument with Stalin about permanent revolution versus “socialism in one country.” (The Bushian version is, “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.”) The Soviet Union tried to gain as many converts to their system as possible, keep them in that system (Brezhnev doctrine) and, in the meantime, fight them in Berlin so we don’t have to fight them in Moscow. The ironic outcome, and not just in the Alanis Morrisette sense, they lost more than they had in the first place when the crackup came. Ukraine, gone. The ’stans, gone. The Baltic republics, gone. Even parts of Mother Russia itself, gone or inflamed.
That didn’t go so well.
And I wonder if there’s a further irony. In terms of genuine national security, is Russia worse off than it was in the late Soviet period? Potential enemies are closer to their borders than ever (that would be us), but far less likely to get into war with Russia than beforehand. We had thousands upon thousands of fusion bombs pointed at Russia. Still do, I realize, but nothing approaching a reason to use them. Russia’s biggest genuine security threat, Islamist agitation from the inhabitants of its border republics, can be seen as a legacy of its imperial drive to conquer and keep (post-1917) those border republics in the first place.
The US has better governance than the Soviets did (for now) but the same grandiose approach to “security.” Meanwhile, the Chinese, who should only hope to be as well-governed as post-republican America, patiently gather. When was the last Chinese, military or civilian, killed by a foreign enemy? And India has even less use for forward strategies of this and that, and a better political and economic system than the Chinese to boot. They have an apparently manageable border problem and handicapped themselves with fifty years of the socialism of spite (a reaction against the relative liberalism of their colonial masters), but have lately shaken that off. Meanwhile, America’s spending line runs one way on the graph, and its revenue line another, and military spending is a putatively untouchable 18+% of the budget and about as much as the military spending of the rest of the world combined. And we can’t even find enough troops to collect all the paychecks we’re trying to cut.
The beaches of Santa Monica look better all the time. They certainly don’t look self-evidently absurd.
Comment by Eric Thompson —
June 13, 2005 @ 8:44 pm
What do you think would have different if the US had defended Santa Monica while the Soviets expanded unimpeded?
Comment by Jim Henley —
June 13, 2005 @ 8:55 pm
Eric, how far do you think the Soviets could have afforded to expand “unimpeded?” Second question: How far did the Sovs get with the Chinese?
Comment by Jim Henley —
June 13, 2005 @ 8:58 pm
Regardless, there is simply no foreign force extant with even Soviet capabilities of aggrandizement. I’m not one of those libertarians who thinks our general cold war strategy was clearly unnecessary or counterproductive, but one of the costs of that strategy was that bureaucracies and behaviorial norms appropriate to that time survived beyond their proper lifespan.
Comment by Leonard —
June 13, 2005 @ 11:25 pm
If the US had stayed isolationist, the Soviets would not have expanded unimpeded. They had a big problem to their West, if you recall, a regime that came close to destroying them. If the USA had stayed home, the Soviet regime may have been defeated; we did help them. Certainly, the Soviets would have been bled even whiter than they were without a viable threat on the Western Front tying down so many of Germany’s men.
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Of course, the “staying home” option isn’t only for 1941 onward. If we had stayed home in Santa Monica in 1917, then quite likely WWI would have been fought to an armistice far more favorable to Germany, with the result of no Hitler. Germany would have thus stood in the way of any Soviet aspirations in Europe.
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But I take it, Eric, that you are really asking the following question: what if the USA had acted in history exactly as it did, running an interventionist foreign policy in WWI and WWII, and only then decided to become isolationism again, really and for true?
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Not very realistic, is that? Nonetheless, I shall give an answer.
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It seems likely that Soviet Union would have expanded into Europe a bit more than they did. They would have probably succeeded in Greece, at least, and probably have at least “finlandized” Germany, France, and Italy. They would also have been successful in converting a few thirdworld countries into commie dictatorships.
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Now, all of that is bad enough for democracy, no doubt, and liberty. But it would not have saved the Soviets. Their system collapsed not because of us, but because it was socialist. Socialism by its nature cannot succeed, for it has no, and can have no, rational capital allocation. There’s plenty of other practical problems as well, but that will do.
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States gain legitimacy from several sources; one big one is economic success. Another is ideological; a third big one is simple success in revolution or war, anything involving mass suffering and usually mass killing. The Soviets gained huge popular legitimacy from winning WWII, but they had no other sources of it. Thus, when that generation died, they ended. Very simple, really.
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It would happened regardless of what the USA had done in the meantime.
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So, let’s examine the balance. There would have been roughly 50 years of extra socialist regimes ruling people that were freer under democracy. That’s the bad side.
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On the good side, America would have stayed the nation it was, without the high taxes, conscription, centralization, warmongering, and foreign adventurism that have characterized the US since WWII. This would have saved literally millions of lives, counting the several million people that perished in Indochina as a result of our war there.
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All in all I don’t see this as an obvious decision to make, even for someone who likes war.
Comment by tc —
June 14, 2005 @ 2:32 am
An invalid comparison. China was dirt poor compared to the US and USSR until recently. Just wait until China’s GDP crosses the US; then we’ll see just how how much power they want to project.
Comment by Jim Henley —
June 14, 2005 @ 6:55 am
tc: I think you’re confusing purposes. Kissinger’s purpose is to show that the Chinese aren’t a military threat to the US. Mine is to show that a secuiry policy centered on defending one’s borders – what we might call a, um, “defense policy” – is workable. That the Chinese may, in future, suffer an attack of imperial hubris won’t change the lesson that it’s possible to mind your own business militarily and, subject to the constraints of your internals, thrive.
Comment by Avram —
June 14, 2005 @ 12:22 pm
On the other hand, how isolationist would China have stayed if it’d had a powerful capitalist class pushing for the use of military force for business purposes? (eg United Fruit, Halliburton, etc)
Trackback by Outside The Beltway —
June 14, 2005 @ 12:25 pm
Kissinger: Containment Won’t Work for China
Former Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, who coauthored the opening of relations with China in 1972, argues that Soviet-style containment policy will not deter China. Further, he argues that it is not necessary.
Chin…
Comment by the talking dog —
June 14, 2005 @ 12:35 pm
Interesting; IIRC, some Chinese may have been knocked off in either Iraq or Afghanistan, though the only two incidents I can seriously think of involving military or governmental losses were (1) when we took out a Chinese fighter pilot in early 2001, and (2) when we blew up the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999…
What the Chinese are, besidees patient, is f’ing smart. While given these facts, and that we are supporting a “renegade province” they say they want back, what we’re actually doing is securing world commercial norms, which are enabling it to prosper right now… (that’s the actual reason for our force projeection– same as the UK whose naval job we inherited post World Wars– keeping the world commercial lanes open and stable for our own benefit… obvious query– is it still worth it, given the cost?)
Why SHOULD the Chinese project their own force, when good old Yankee masochism is doing it for Beijing? Indeed, even in the hey-day of Mao, why SHOULD China embark on world-wide socialist revolution, when the nearby Soviets were doing such a good job of it already?
China had some fascinating , well-placed allies (Albania, God knows why; Pakistan as a check on potentially irritating neighbor India); North Korea because its best to be inside pissing out…
But each of them served its purposes. Think of China’s grand strategies as a sort of “jackal-politik”; preserve its own interests, allow others to do the heavy-liffting, bide their time, and pounce on the carcass when, and if, ever appropriate…
I try to follow the People’s Daily every week, because the Chinese are by far the most fascinating players on the planet right now… and probably the best…Great post.
Comment by Eric Thompson —
June 14, 2005 @ 12:56 pm
Eric, how far do you think the Soviets could have afforded to expand “unimpeded? Second question: How far did the Sovs get with the Chinese?
Certainly further than they expanded while impeded by another superpower opposing that expansion. To the second, not terribly far.
…I’m not one of those libertarians who thinks our general cold war strategy was clearly unnecessary or counterproductive…
If you’re suggesting that the US could have successfully dealt with the USSR by turtling up and preparing to fend off attacks on US territory, along the lines of China’s policies, then why wouldn’t those policies have been unnecessary and counter-productive?
Comment by Eric Thompson —
June 14, 2005 @ 1:12 pm
So, let’s examine the balance. There would have been roughly 50 years of extra socialist regimes ruling people that were freer under democracy. That’s the bad side.
You make an interesting assumption that the timing of the collapse of the Soviet system was not affected in any way by American opposition. I don’t share it, and am curious why you think that especially since China itself suggests a clear source of longevity for an unthreatened Soviet regime – a shift to somewhat more fascist lines.
On the good side, America would have stayed the nation it was, without the high taxes, conscription, centralization, warmongering, and foreign adventurism that have characterized the US since WWII. This would have saved literally millions of lives, counting the several million people that perished in Indochina as a result of our war there.
You seem to elide over the deaths caused by the USSR and other communist regimes that we could have expected in countries that were never invaded in real history. Not to mention, when you talk of fuel for the system, the wars the USSR and others could have prosecuted while unhindered by the US and the greater ideological legitimacy victories would have given. With more communist regimes, you’ve more opportunity for more Pol Pots, maybe even more Stalins.
So I’m skeptical of this balance sheet.
Of course, my concern is much more the issue of defending the US than how American blood and treasure benefited others.
All in all I don’t see this as an obvious decision to make, even for someone who likes war.
Oh well, that makes it simpler. The only reason I disagree is that I like war, obviously.
Comment by Leonard —
June 14, 2005 @ 4:25 pm
Eric, I regard the Chinese regime as on its last legs. The Chinese leadership gained its legitimacy from the revolution in 1948; this leadership cadre ruled without break through ~2003-2004, when Jiang Zeming was displaced in the regime by Hu Jintao. My normal estimate for a regime based on longevity of a cadre is 50 years; apparently the old men in China held on a bit longer than seems to be average.
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The state in China, if it has any legitimacy at all, is getting it strictly via the “economy” route. Thus, when the economy eventually turns down, I predict substantial unrest, and some sort of evolution or revolution.
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How that will go… well, that’s a big question. A bloody revolution there could cause millions or tens of millions of deaths.
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The soviet system lasted along with the cadre of WWII. When they all finally died (enough that a young punk like Gorby could grab the reins), well, you know what happened. Did America affect the course of that? Well, certainly it must have at least a little bit. But I don’t the effect was at all critical. In the big picture, once a state lacks legitimacy it is simply a matter of time before it falls apart. Socialist states, in the long run, cannot deliver the goods. Thus, in the long run, they change. How long it takes them to fall apart once they lack any legitimacy – that is the big question, and that is something that an outside nation may affect.
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As for what hypothetical things the Soviets might have done in controlling more countries than they did – well, sure, it might have been very bad. Or, it might not have. Certainly it would have been possible for Western Europe to defend itself against the Soviets after WWII without our help, or with only technical help (i.e., we give them the bomb too). It is fallacious to assert that since the US spent X historically on containment, that if it had not nobody else would have.
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As I said, what I regard as most likely for this counterfactual is a finlandization of Western Europe – that is, no actual war/invasion by the Red Army, rather, that they toe the line diplomatically, acknowledge the sphere of influence, etc. Hence, none of the mayhem that goes along with war and invasion. Finland itself is a very nice country.
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As for using outside conquest to gain legitimacy for the Soviet state, well, that’s a good objection. However I doubt that the Soviets would have risked the money and blood necessary to create a true mass war. Absent that, I don’t think you’d get a cadre with perceived legitimacy. The thing that operates there is that most people find the notion of their loved ones dying in vain as unthinkable. Since they died under the direction of the state and its officers, they must be OK.
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I did not say you like war, nor, for that matter, even that you disagree with me. I said it was not an clear decision to make, even if you like war. This implies only that it is easier to decide if you like war (i.e., the warfare state: high taxation, conscription, etc.).
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I can give you lots of scenarios, all counterfactual, where isolationism works out better for America. I can also give you scenarios where it doesn’t, i.e., Europe is forced to defend itself with nukes, leading to nuclear exchange in Europe and a resulting nuclear winter worldwide. I am sure you can think up such scenarios too. What does it all prove? That when arguing the counterfactual, nobody ever agrees.
Comment by Barry —
June 14, 2005 @ 5:21 pm
Three comments:
First, the strategy during WWII (expansionist powers hell-bent on conquest) isn’t necessarily the appropriate strategy now.
Second, the Cold War strategy isn’t necessarily the appropriate strategy now – and does carry lots of costs, even if it pointing those costs out wasn’t politically popular at the time.
Third, a policy of ‘protect the sea lanes’ plays to our strengths, and as long as it is truly ‘protect the sea lanes’, it’s popular with most countries.
Comment by Charles Hueter —
June 14, 2005 @ 9:38 pm
If there is any remaining justice in this world, someone will approach Mr. Henley with an offer to write this post up for a large publication. Good stuff, Sir.
Trackback by the talking dog —
June 26, 2005 @ 8:54 am
Strong enough for a man, but made for a woman
This week’s visit to our comrades at People’s Daily gives us this account of PRC Premier Wen Jibao’s assurances to the world that Chinese expansion of its economy has absolutely…