For the Historians
When it’s over, if it’s ever over, we need a history that treats the US conflict with and in Iraq as one war, starting in Fall 1990 and continuing through (whenever). Only then can we begin to reckon the true costs with such benefits as accrue. This scheme is not ipso facto dovish. One take a prowar historian might offer is that the struggle to replace the government of Saddam Hussein with a sustainable alternative represents a triumph of bipartisan resolve, in which, after expelling the Iraqi Army from Kuwait and devastating Iraq’s infrastructure in a strategic bombing campaign, the Bush I administration turns to a policy of “regime-change-within-the-form” backed by a low-grade war of air strikes and espionage, authorized by international institutions substantially under US national control (the UNSC and NATO). The Clinton Administration sustains this policy for eight years against no serious domestic opposition; then, under the second Bush Administration, conditions ripen and large bipartisan majorities authorize outright conquest, to be followed by reconstruction. There follow in-theater reverses and home front schism of uncertain seriousness, but the ending has yet to be written.
Even such a history would be preferable to the imagined course of events of the last fifteen years, in which there was a short, glorious victory in 1991, succeeded by nothing in particular, followed by a barely-related short, glorious victory in 2003, followed by a certain amount of trouble. In particular, understanding the continuity of American policy from 1991-2003, and that it constituted anything but “inaction,” would improve the national conversation.
Comment by baroose —
August 12, 2005 @ 8:46 am
Of course it has been one long conflict! I daresay the pilots who enforced the no-fly zones from 91 – 02 (and I personally know a few) believed they were in one very long, although largely inconsequential, campaign.
Perhaps we could give a catchy name, like the “15 Years War”, although we may have to use a larger number. Oh, I forgot. We don’t do wars anymore. Make that “The 15 Year Struggle Against Violent Extremeism”.
Comment by Leonard —
August 12, 2005 @ 9:27 am
If we admit that we were killing the Iraqi people for ten years, we admit that one of the reasons that Al Qaida chose to attack us was true. But terrorists cannot ever win. To admit they were right would be spitting in the face of 3000 innocent dead and 1700 pure and brave troops who would never fight for any improper end.
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Therefore, the seeming truth about our killing must be a mirage. If “history” says we attacked Iraq, so much the worse for “history”. Who you gonna believe, your heart or your lyin’ eyes?
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Obviously “history” is no way to approach a matter like this. Instead, we must all join hands, and say together: “Our intentions are always good and intent is all that matters. Thus say we all.”
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And then a rousing rendition of Kumbaya.
Comment by Nell —
August 12, 2005 @ 10:23 am
This stings: The Clinton Administration sustains this policy for eight years against no serious domestic opposition because I was part of the opposition. It’s true that in this period it was the left alone against the sanctions, but there was enough discomfort and noise created for the powers that be to respond (in the form of “reformed” sanctions, which were an improvement but that’s not saying much, and in talk of even further reduced “smart sanctions” as the BushCo crowd moved in). I grant that the British and international anti-sanctions campaigning was stronger than in the U.S. What you say is basically correct, but it does sting.
Comment by Nell —
August 12, 2005 @ 10:26 am
I also want to dispute the large bipartisan majorities for the current phase of the war. Before the war, 65-70 percent of grassroots Democrats (not elected officials) did oppose the invasion. “Our” Congresspeople mostly held their hands over their ears.
Comment by Nell —
August 12, 2005 @ 10:36 am
While we’re taking things in a grand historical sweep (15-20 years being that in this country), let me put out another perspective on the 1990-91 conflict: a demonstration war, meant to drive home the ‘lone superpower’ message and to insert long-term bases into Saudi Arabia. (With a political bonus to Bush I re-election, which didn’t turn out to be enough.)
We did get the Saudis to invite us in with fake satellite photos, and we didn’t leave as they’d expected. But this is more confirmation of Al Q complaints, so it might take another generation of historians to face up to that.
Comment by tc —
August 12, 2005 @ 10:51 am
I don’t think so. There’s a qualitative difference between no-fly/sanctions, which were cheap (~1 billion/year, zero planes shot down) and full-on invasion and occupation with 140,000 troops. You think President Gore would have occupied Iraq? Maybe bombed the place a la Desert Fox, sure, but there was no widespread desire for war against Iraq until the Bush administration whipped it up.
Comment by Jim Henley —
August 12, 2005 @ 9:00 pm
A few things: Nell, y’all fought the good fight, but you were just people, you know what I’m saying? There was no poobah opposition to speak of. (Note to self: investigate etymology of “poobah.”) Same with October 2002. The elites in the Democratic Party were either okay with it or afraid not to be seen to be okay with it.
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Leonard and back to Nell: To be fair, let’s not forget that the opening shot in the war was fired by the Iraqis themselves when they conquered Kuwait. I know they had their reasons (slant drilling and driving the price of oil down) but if you want to make a list of countries too prone to “solve” disputes militarily and Iraq certainly goes on that list.
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Which brings me to the next thing, relating to Nell’s final point: We lied like hell to the Saudis and the world about the posture of Iraqi troops and the incubators and all of that. I do think though that GHWB and especially Maggie were broadly sincere – Iraq really did commit an act of territorial aggression contrary to, among other things, the UN Charter, and I think they meant all that “This will not stand” collective self-defense stuff. I would allow that the decision to go to war with Iraq over Kuwait in 1991 was justifiable in a way that the subsequent dozen-year phony peace and outright conquest were not. I just don’t think, in retrospect, it was prudent.
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tc, I don’t know if President Gore would have occupied Iraq or not. Gore came out of the New Republic wing of the Democratic Party and made his bones as one of the Democratic Party’s chief hawks.
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But I don’t really care that much. For eight years the Clinton Administration sustained the posture and replicated the rhetoric that undergirded the eventual Republican decision to undertake violent regime change. The Clinton Administration fostered numerous coup attempts; the Clinton Administration launched literally thousands of bombing sorties, before, during and AFTER Desert Fox. The Clinton Administration in concert with Blairite Britain sustained the sanctions via UN veto and made it explicit that the US would never allow the end of sanctions so long as Saddam was in power, regardless of the intent of sanctions, which was to compel Iraq to give up its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and programs. Regardless of the presence of a Democrat in the White House and notwithstanding Mr. Gore’s residency at the Naval Observatory, the official message of the US government remained that SADDAM HUSSEIN WAS A UNIQUELY THREATENING MONSTER WHOSE CONTINUED RULE THE WORLD COULD NOT COUNTENANCE. There is no room for doubt that, under Clinton/Gore as under GHWB and the first year or so of Bush II, US policy was aimed at the slow “strangulation” of Saddam Hussein’s rule, and that military action was as important a component of this policy as espionage. It’s also indisputable that the nation came out of the Clinton/Gore years with the same “Saddam matters, Saddam threatens us, Saddam must go” message in its ears as it heard through the second half of Bush I. Furthermore, by the hostility this policy engendered in the Muslim world, the Clinton Administration helped bring about the very circumstances that enabled the Republicans to go to the hurry-up offense after the September 11, 2001 atrocities.
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Clinton and Gore set the table. GWB served the meal.
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Now, if you think deposing Saddam by force was a good idea, you can see the same history in an entirely more positive light. GHWB’s 1991 coalition would not have countenanced regime change as an endgame. Moreover, the Iraqi military of 1991 was much stronger than that of 2003. The dozen-year phony peace enabled the reduction of Iraq’s standup defensive capability to nil; it gave the US and Britain time and opportunity to sell regime change as – if nothing else – unavoidable to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan; it, um, stripped Iraq of its biochem weapons capabilities; and allowed US global preeminence to wax. (In 1991 Russian objections still had to be taken seriously, for instance. By 2003 they were an afterthought.)
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The downside is the dozen years the Baath regime had to plan an unconventional warfare strategy. Plus the change in mood of those darn mujahedeen.
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But I have no more patience for talk of some Golden Age of Goreite discretion we just missed than I do for collages of terror attacks that happened before the collage-maker was paying attention to American foreign policy.
Comment by Rich Puchalsky —
August 12, 2005 @ 9:47 pm
I don’t see it, Jim. It appears that different Presidents prosecuted widely different wars.
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Bush I had pretty much the optimal success that could be achieved, given that Iraq decided to conquer Kuwait. He pushed Iraq back out, destroyed its offensive military capacity, instituted sanctions with wide international support, and carefully did not push on to capture Iraq, thus not making the country our problem.
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Clinton basically kept the policy that he inherited at the end of Bush I unchanged, using none of the political chips that would have been required to change the situation in any way.
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Bush II restarted war at the first pretext and bungled it.
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Therefore, even if policy appeared not to change over this period, priorities and competence certainly did. Gore would have handled the situation differently than Bush II. Assuming that he would have been a clone of Clinton, we wouldn’t be occupying Iraq right now. You can call this discretion or some less good-sounding word, but there it is.
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The myth of a single war spanning multiple adminstrations might apply where national existence is at stake. But in wars of choice, the policy makers choose different things.
Comment by Nancy Lebovitz —
August 13, 2005 @ 1:44 am
Jim, what do you think would have been a reasonable long-term policy towards Iraq–leaving the sanctions in place till Saddam died of old age would have been incredibly destructive, even if less so than the current war.
Comment by Nell —
August 13, 2005 @ 11:52 am
Etymology of poohbah: the character Pooh-Bah in Gilbert and Sullivan’s Mikado.
Comment by Nell —
August 13, 2005 @ 12:04 pm
Magisterial, Jim. I go back and forth on the sincerity and legitimacy of Gulf War phase I, but still end up on the “lured Saddam into it” side. A less megalomaniacal and bellicose bastard wouldn’t have been so easily lured, of course.
The history needs to begin late in the Iraq-Iran war, too, rather than 1990. But these are quibbles.
For a direct, harsh examination of the Dem poohbahs still keeping a lid on the politics of the war, see Ari Berman’s excellent The Strategic Class. No surprises for frequent readers of this site, but it names names and is well written. Preview doesn’t like my xhtml, so no link, but go to thenation.com and look under the politics section on the front page.
Pingback by The Best and the Loudest § Unqualified Offerings —
August 13, 2005 @ 9:31 pm
[...] ’t just striking poses; they really believe this stuff. Also, as discussed at length below, even to the extent that hawkish Dem practice is more prudent and r [...]
Comment by tc —
August 14, 2005 @ 3:35 am
I don’t doubt that there was a continuity of “regime change” policy, but sponsoring coups, sanctions, and bombings are on a different level than actual occupation, both in terms of the costs to America and the political groundwork that needs to be laid to support it. I don’t think Bush I, who got this whole thing started, would have invaded; guys like Powell and Scowcroft thought it was a bad idea. You may laugh at the hypothetical benefits of a Gore presidency, but like Puchalsky, I believe it would have been an age, not of discretion, but at least non-occupation.
Comment by JL —
August 14, 2005 @ 7:02 pm
From a historiographical point of view, yes, one can’t be reminded of terms like Archidamian and Decelean. One war, divided into parts, with consequences utterly unforseen at the outset. It’s always worth rereading Thucydides, as, in fact, the U.S. military does. Its leaders, not so much.
Pingback by IOU § Unqualified Offerings —
August 15, 2005 @ 10:41 pm
[...] ur World Since October 2001 August 15, 2005 IOU Nancy Lebovitz, an answer to your question, “Jim, what do you think would have been a reasonable [...]
Comment by Barry —
August 16, 2005 @ 8:53 am
Rich:
“…Clinton basically kept the policy that he inherited at the end of Bush I unchanged, using none of the political chips that would have been required to change the situation in any way.”
Rich, I don’t see Clinton as ever having had such political chips in the first place. Remobilizing the US Army to put it back into the Middle East in full 500K personnel force, starting a war, and not a limited war?