Time Considered as a Helix of Foreign Policy Failures
Spencer Ackerman explains how “we find ourselves in a comparable situation to the unhappy 1998-2001 era” regarding al-Qaeda. It turns out the Jamestown Foundation’s Chris Quillen has also speculated – as I did – that al-Qaeda may have a sanctuary deal with Pakistan that restricts the kinds of operations it can take against the US homeland. Even so, few Americans will like the idea of the masterminds of the atrocities of September 2001 having safe haven. A number of things jump out from the New York Times report that kicked off Spencer’s piece. Note that the reporting relies on anonymous statements of intelligence officials, which are always at risk of being wrong or deliberately distorted.
1. More evidence for the absurdity of “fighting them over there so we don’t have to fight them here” as a justification for continuing US involvement in Iraq’s wars. “Flypaper theory” loses another round and “Jihad University” wins again:
[American intelligence and counterterrorism officials] said dozens of seasoned fighters were moving between Pakistan and Iraq, apparently engaging in an “exchange of best practices†for attacking American forces.
Over the past year, insurgent tactics from Iraq have migrated to Afghanistan, where suicide bombings have increased fivefold and roadside bomb attacks have doubled.
Even more importantly, officials claim that “core al-Qaeda” is once again training terrorists to strike beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in Great Britain.
2. As in 1998-2001, everybody official and everybody “serious” is treating ant-American and anti-British terrorism as a tactical-military problem to be solved via action against terror groups. Nobody the Times talks to considers the possibility that the real solution is reorienting American foreign policy (and its British auxiliary) away from interventionism and “a lot of wars, dawg.”
3. James Joyner is irked that US policy-makers show such tender regard for the fortunes of Pakistani strongman Pervez Musharraf by avoiding military action against Waziristan camps that might threaten his government, writing “it’s far from clear why we should care whether the incompetent thug Musharraf continues to hold the power he took in a coup. The rationale for supporting despots on the enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend thesis is always thin; doing so when they’re not even the enemy of your enemy is madness.”
I hold no brief for Pervez Musharraf, but the one thing he’s managed in the last six years is to keep hold of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. I’ve thought since 2001 that acquiring control of one or more of Pakistan’s nukes was the penultimate aim of Bin Laden’s anti-US operations (using them on America being the ultimate aim). A Jihadist-led anti-Musharraf coup might provide just the chaos necessary for Core al-Qaeda to realize that dream.
4. You can make a case that al-Qaeda’s second life in Waziristan is a result of the US getting “distracted” from Afghanistan by Iraq, but you can make at least as good a case that events show the pointlessness of invading Afghanistan in the first place. The political limitations on attacking Pakistan were always going to be there, whether the US invaded Iraq or not. There may have been better, less military means of g0ing Bin Laden and his brain trust after the massacres of September 11, 2001. The US as a whole and the Bush Administration in particular may have put more premium on the emotional satisfaction of hitting somebody than the bona fide achievement of shutting down the 9/11 killers. In other words, the current situation in Waziristan should make us reconsider the merits of the most marginalized figures in Western politics, the Afghan-war doves.
5. Notwithstanding the above, the Iraq wars have hurt America’s position enormously: by opening Jihad University; by exposing the limits of what our absurdly expensive military can actually accomplish; by providing a hundred recruiting posters for anti-American terror; by wasting hundreds of billions of dollars on a fool’s crusade and by things I’d think of if I too another couple of minutes. Nothing we’ve actually accomplished toward making America more genuinely secure depends on it, and much that we’ve failed to do stems therefrom.
Comment by marcel —
February 19, 2007 @ 5:49 pm
But we blew a lot of stuff up, on TV yet. That was pretty cool, dontcha think? Worth every penny!
Comment by gbh —
February 19, 2007 @ 6:07 pm
dude,
don’t be trying to pimp for the afghan war doves, this country needs some group we can all come together and mock.
Comment by CharleyCarp —
February 19, 2007 @ 7:05 pm
Flypaper theory is valid, if you consider the US Army to be the flies.
We’ll never know what might have been had the US used its moral authority in 02-03 to mop up AQ in Pakistan. The raids capturing RBAS in September 2002 and KSM in March 2003 don’t seem to have harmed the Pakistani government, and if we hadn’t squandered both momentum and legitimacy on Iraq, maybe OBL and Dr. Z could have been had as well.
Comment by Avedon —
February 19, 2007 @ 9:00 pm
I just heard Gore Vidal say on the radio that “we have to fight them over there so we don’t have to fight them here” is the stupidest thing any president has ever said. I’ve certainly always thought it was a contender….
Comment by Nell —
February 19, 2007 @ 9:08 pm
In other words, the current situation in Waziristan should make us reconsider the merits of the most marginalized figures in Western politics, the Afghan-war doves.
Ta-dah!
But hey, it’s almost inconceivable that anyone in a position of power in this country would have chosen another response than to hit back. Ain’t that America, and all that…
Not to mention that anyone who’d have responded differently might not have pushed the policies that got us here to begin with.
Comment by Nell —
February 19, 2007 @ 9:09 pm
Feel free to come together and mock me.
Comment by Hesiod —
February 19, 2007 @ 10:41 pm
Actually, I’d say INdia is the reason we haven;t done anything that could topple MUsharraff. That’s the LAST thing they’d want.
The prospect of jihadis gaining control over Pakistani nuclear weapons is first and foremost a threat to India.
But INdia’s not alone in that. The US, in fact, is far down the list of worried countries.
Russia can’t afford to have any Cheches get ahold of nukes. The Chginese can;t afford it either.
Nor can, ironically, the Iranians!
Comment by BruceR —
February 20, 2007 @ 12:21 am
I think for the “Afghan dove” position to merit such renewed respect, one would have to argue that (without the Iraq misadventure), Al Qaeda would obviously have been incapable of repeating/topping 9/11 from a secure Afghan base any time in the last five years. I’m not sure that’s sustainable.
Smashing an adversary’s setup to the degree where he needs over five years to reconstitute in a new location would still seem to count as a battle, albeit not a war, won, at least by most historical measures. And that’s despite it being clearly a secondary effort for the U.S. after 2003.
In any case, the cataclysm of the Iraq war necessarily skews hindsight. A past without Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, etc., but with an undiminished capacity for U.S. global intervention, as seemingly unlimited in its potential as it still appeared to be in 2002, could very well have resulted in very different attitudes within the Muslim world — and particularly terrorist-harboring regimes seeking to avoid the Taliban’s fate — towards Al Qaeda, et al. Never mind the increased possibility of getting the guy with you know, some kind of actual focus to the whole strategy thing that back here on Earth-One turned out to be somewhat lacking.
Comment by BruceR —
February 20, 2007 @ 12:30 am
Further, if Waziristan was just as or more convenient to Al Qaeda operations as Taliban-regime Afghanistan c. 2000, then Bin Laden would have set up shop there in the first place, surely. Yet Afghanistan was the ground of his own choosing: so denying that ground would still seem to have had something of a strategic point to it. At the least, it suggests your point about the “political limitations on attacking Pakistan” was not immediately apparent to Bin Laden.
Comment by tc —
February 20, 2007 @ 12:32 am
the bona fide achievement of shutting down the 9/11 killers
And how are you supposed to do that when they’re safe in Afghanistan?
Comment by Eric Martin —
February 20, 2007 @ 10:32 am
What BruceR said.
To further his point, it would be wrong to downplay what Musharraf is actually doing in Waziristan – or at least how he is cooperating with US or joint action in the region.
There have been multiple air strikes, and some actual successes in terms of taking out popular Taliban/Qaeda types. This may be one of the reasons why Afghanistan was preferable to Waziristan from bin Laden’s perspective.
The Taliban was overwhelmingly friendly, whereas the Musharraf regime would probably like these elements to be purged. Musharraf can only go so far, so quickly, but there is a different underlying dynamic.
Waziristan is not as friendly to bin Laden. Even the training camps and other activities in this region are on a smaller scale, more hidden from view and incur the costs associated with harrassment from the sovereign – even if somewhat removed geographically.
Comment by Hayden —
February 20, 2007 @ 2:45 pm
Best blog post title ever. And of course a valid point about “Jihad University.” The “exchange” programs are particularly troubling.
Comment by James —
February 20, 2007 @ 7:45 pm
Al-Qaeda’s actual ability to conduct 9/11 style attacks was shut down 3/4 of the way through the actual 9/11 attacks, when the passengers of the last plane figured out what was happening. And simply adding locks to the doors to the pilot cabin would also work. So they would need a new trick.
The 9/11 hijackers didn’t come from Afghanistan, in any case; they came from Europe, and before that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. If someone is thinking that there is some al-Qaeda James Bondian Lair, from which all plots emanate, then fantasy has gotten the better of you. It’s a distributed operation, so there is no such thing as winning a “battle” against them, and thinking in war terms just makes the problem less tractable.
Any time anyone wants to put together and blow up a building, a la Okalahoma City, they can do it, and kill plenty of people. But I don’t see al-Qaeda bothering. First, it wouldn’t be as spectacular as 9/11, and second, the United States is doing a fine job of killing Americans and destroying its influence as it stands. Why interfere with an enemy’s self destruction?
Comment by Eric Martin —
February 21, 2007 @ 12:01 pm
Al-Qaeda’s actual ability to conduct 9/11 style attacks was shut down 3/4 of the way through the actual 9/11 attacks, when the passengers of the last plane figured out what was happening. And simply adding locks to the doors to the pilot cabin would also work. So they would need a new trick.
Sure, but, er, couldn’t they try a new style? Adaptability is not something we own a monopoly of. In fact, our adversaries have shown a defter touch than us in this respect.
The 9/11 hijackers didn’t come from Afghanistan, in any case; they came from Europe, and before that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. If someone is thinking that there is some al-Qaeda James Bondian Lair, from which all plots emanate, then fantasy has gotten the better of you.
Yes. Actually, bin Laden and Zawahiri didn’t come from Afghanistan either. Nor did the vast cadre of Afghan Arabs that comprise al-Qaeda.
But, and this is not an insignificant but, the 9/11 plot, its funding, its recruitment, its logistics was coordinated by al-Qaeda’s leadership in Afghanistan. Some of the hijackers received instruction in training camps there. Having a central location from which to indoctrinate, train, recruit and coordinate is a boon to al-Qaeda. Denying them such a locale is in our interest.
Not at all costs, but this should not be ignored either.
Comment by Jim Henley —
February 21, 2007 @ 12:08 pm
I think it might be worth disentangling two propositions that seem to keep flowing together:
1. The Afghan War doves were right all along.
2. The Afghan War doves weren’t ridiculous to believe what they believed.
IOW, it’s possible that the Afghan War as, on balance, worth fighting but ALSO that arguments against it had merit.
Comment by Eric Martin —
February 21, 2007 @ 1:14 pm
I can live with both those Jim. Actually, that’s my position.
Comment by James —
February 21, 2007 @ 9:15 pm
The indoctrination and recruitment of the 9/11 hijackers came earlier, I think, in Wahhabist schools and radical Mosques. Their relevant “combat training” came in flight schools in Florida.
I’ll buy the argument that making a pilgrimage to some rugged desert camp, shouting slogans and even getting some basic weapons training can help inspire and solidify a group, but the idea that it needs to be in any specific location seems thin.
So what is left? The “cult of personality?” Not to be sneezed at, but it seems suspiciously similar to the demonization that made the country a sucker for a war against Saddam. Bin Laden is bound to die someday; will everything then be just fine?
As for the “coordinated” part, I was under the impression there was some coordination that was a lot closer to the main game than Afghanistan, as was the funding (they weren’t paying their motel bills with Afghani credit cards). In any case, I have my doubts about any claims (including mine) to have a deep understanding of an organization that no one seems to be able to locate. Exactly how much of our “information” comes from the boasts of its members? How much from such dubious sources as torture?
Can they come up with a new style? Perhaps. But then how would you know it was al-Qaeda, and not some other wannabe?
Comment by Eric Martin —
February 22, 2007 @ 10:20 am
Can they come up with a new style? Perhaps. But then how would you know it was al-Qaeda, and not some other wannabe?
Does it make a difference really? I’m of the mind that we should assume al-Qaeda is capable of adapting, and capable of conducting terrorist attacks other than plane hijackings flown into buildings. It’s true that if al-Qaeda tries something other than hijacking/building targeting, we might not know it’s al-Qaeda, but, er, so?
I don’t mean to be pedantic here James, maybe I’m just not following that line of argumentation.
Also, for the record, al-Qaeda has actually mastered a few “new tricks” (or old tricks depending) such as train bombings, car boombings and even bombings of seaborne vessels.
The indoctrination and recruitment of the 9/11 hijackers came earlier, I think, in Wahhabist schools and radical Mosques. Their relevant “combat training†came in flight schools in Florida.
Yes, but the indoctrination of some of the planners of those attacks came in Afghanistan. Also, the indoctrination of terrorists other than those that committed the 9/11 attacks. As for “recruitment”, yes, most are initially recruited at Mosques in Europe or the Middle East, but making the trip to Afghanistan is significant because of the further radicalization and solidification of commitment – as you said.
As far as “specific” location, no it doesn’t have to be. But it has to be “a” location. As Marc Sageman pointed out in his seminal work, having a central locale that aspiring jihadists could migrate to was very valuable in order to create networks, share tactics, and then, as we mentioned upthread, indoctrinate, train and radicalize.
As for the “coordinated†part, I was under the impression there was some coordination that was a lot closer to the main game than Afghanistan, as was the funding (they weren’t paying their motel bills with Afghani credit cards).
Of course. But the funds were designated by the brain trust in Afghanistan, the plot was laid out by the brain trust in Afghanistan, the arrangements made, etc. Now it doesn’t have to be Afghanistan per se, but I’m in favor of disrupting al-Qaeda’s command and control where the costs aren’t prohibitive.
BTW: this is part of the reason why Iraq was such a collosal mistake. It gives al-Qaeda a chance to test tactics, train potential recruits, create networks, radicalize and indoctrinate.
Comment by Jim Henley —
February 22, 2007 @ 10:27 am
I’m detecting a pattern . . .
Comment by James —
February 22, 2007 @ 3:06 pm
In for a penny, in for a pound…
20 Reasons Why We Should Not Have Invaded Afghanistan
1. It’s Afghanistan.
2. The Taliban had no involvement with 9/11. Toppling that government because of 9/11 was one of the first examples of the blurring of distinctions among 9/11 conspirators, jihadists generally, jihadist sympathizers, terrorists generally, Islamists, Muslims, Arabs, and anyone the Bush Administration happens not to like.
3. It’s Afghanistan.
4. It was an act of war. War is generally a bad idea. It is a negative sum game, and there is an absolute guarantee that innocent people will be killed. When the primary grievance was the loss of innocent lives on 9/11, a response that costs more innocent lives calls into question the moral basis of that response.
5. The Guantánamo Bay detainment camp.
6. The Taliban Government of Afghanistan, however repellent it might have seemed to various observers, was the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and was recognized as such by the U.S. The United States therefore undertook to topple a sovereign government whose transgression was harboring a fugitive, a fugitive who, it should be noted, had never set foot in the U.S., nor ever been indicted for the 9/11 attacks (although there are prior U.S. indictments dating back to 1998). In any event, it is not clear that the Taliban could have delivered bin Laden even if they so desired, and sans extradition treaties, it’s not entirely clear what the legal basis would have been for doing so.
7. The “no land wars in Asia†thing.
8. There is every reason to believe that the invasion of Afghanistan was a result that was not only expected by bin Laden and company, but one that was actively desired. The occupation of Afghanistan played a major role in breaking the Soviet Union, and the possibility of doing the same to the U.S. cannot have been discounted by the planners of 9/11. The idea that the invasion caught al-Qaeda by surprise is preposterous, and any comment along the lines of “We could have caught him in Tora Bora,†should be followed with something like “if only the Fuhrer had listened to me,†or “if it hadn’t been for those meddling kids and their stupid dog.â€
9. There is a children’s game in Afghanistan where a group of young boys tie up one of the group, push him down in the dirt, and then kick more dirt on him until he manages to spit on one of the other boys, who then gets tied up etc. You have trouble spitting if you are either angry or afraid.
10. The United States supplied a substantial amount of ordinance to the Afghani mujahadeen during the Soviet Occupation. An unknown, but probably substantial amount of this ordinance still exists, ready for use in IEDs.
11. It’s Afghanistan!
12. War is an action between sovereign states. A military response to terrorism itself validates terrorism, by conveying the status of sovereignty to terrorists, magnifying their perceived importance in their own eyes and those of their followers. Bin Laden is now perceived by some more as a head-of-state-in-exile than a criminal.
13. Helicopters crash more frequently in mountainous territory.
14. The creation of a large number of refugees, who then fled to Pakistan, running the risk of destabilizing a country with a large Islamist population and nuclear weapons.
15. A military response to terrorism makes it much more difficult, even impossible, to later invoke the criminal justice system. This further undercuts the rule of law, which is another terrorist objective.
16. The story goes that some Afghani mountain tribesmen pass the winter months with a bar of steel and a file. By the time spring comes, they have made a rifle.
17. Opium production in Afghanistan was nearly eliminated in 2001; in 2006 it was estimated at nearly 6000 metric tons. However one feels about drug laws, the illegal drug trade is a source of violence and corruption wherever it exists.
18. The Taliban was the product of a generation traumatized by the warfare of the 1970s and 1980s. Upon taking power, their first actions were extreme, but there are arguments that they had begun to moderate by the late 1990s, owing to the inevitable practical compromises that come with actually having to rule. The latest foreign occupation has traumatized a new generation, and we can expect the same aftermath and blowback if, as seems likely, they eventually return to power.
19. Whether or not the invasion of Afghanistan was primarily based on racism and militarism, it certainly gave aid and comfort to racists and militarists in the United States and elsewhere.
20. It’s AFGHANISTAN!
Comment by Eric Martin —
February 22, 2007 @ 4:25 pm
I’m detecting a pattern . . .
OK, cause I know you like variety Jim, I’ll throw in kidnapping and ransom.
Comment by Jim Henley —
February 22, 2007 @ 4:30 pm
Eric: Awesome.