Unqualified Offerings

Looking Sideways at Your World Since October 2001
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May 12, 2007

Ur Manz Who Wazn’t There, Revisited

Major General Benjamin R. Mixon wants more troops for Diyala province. As Peter Spiegel, Tina Susman and Garrett Therolf report in the LA Times, Mixon is “withering in his criticism of the Iraqi government, saying it was hamstrung by bureaucracy and compromised by corruption and sectarian discord, making it unable to assist U.S. forces in Diyala.” They also report that

Mixon, speaking Friday by teleconference from Camp Speicher, outside Tikrit, to a Pentagon news conference, said that he did not have enough soldiers to provide security in Diyala. The local government is “nonfunctional” and the central government is “ineffective,” he said.

“I’m going to need additional forces,” he said, “to get that situation to a more acceptable level, so the Iraqi security forces will be able in the future to handle that.”

Now, at least on paper, the “Iraqi security forces” are part of the Iraqi government. If it doesn’t function, they can’t function, at least not in the way that American commenters talk about them functioning, as taking responsibility for real security. Four years into this calamity the official American discourse around it remains as disconnected from reality as ever.

Posted by Jim Henley @ 10:50 am, Filed under: Main

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6 Responses to “Ur Manz Who Wazn’t There, Revisited”

  1. Comment by Nell
    May 12, 2007 @ 11:17 am

    Huh. I thought that under the new escalation plan, there wasn’t even any pretense of relying on the Iraqi army. The defeat, when it comes, will be ours alone.

  2. Comment by Nell
    May 12, 2007 @ 11:35 am

    Two previous comments have disappeared into the ether, so this time I won’t include a link:

    It was my impression that under the escalation, there was no longer much of a pretense that we’d be relying on Iraqi forces (per Michael Hirsh Newsweek article from late February). One of the consequences, pointed up early on by Pat Lang, is that when defeat comes it will be ours alone, and unmistakable.

  3. Comment by markg8
    May 12, 2007 @ 1:44 pm

    Kevin Drum quotes some guy speculating that
    Gates has taken the muzzle his commanders in Iraq in order for them to put pressure on the Iraqi government to get to work. I can’t see how that squares with DoD recently shutting down all blogs and emails from soldiers in Iraq.

  4. Comment by Barry
    May 12, 2007 @ 3:03 pm

    Markg8, IMHO the latter policy is due to the nature of the situation, which is Bush shoveling the mess forward onto the next president. We now have an army which is going on to 3rd tours of Iraq Extended looooong tours. After four years of sh*t getting wors. With younger officers bailing out like crazy (see Intel Dump) as soon as they can. More people realizing that the plan is not to win (because that’s not possible), but to stretch out that long, painful process of losing.

    With added Bush administration pleasures such as equipment shortages and lousy medical care.

    Morale is going to hit rock bottom, where it’ll be drilling down even further. Keeping this from the open realization of the American people is all that’s left.

  5. Comment by Nell
    May 12, 2007 @ 4:42 pm

    Or, as Thomas Nephew puts it in the title of a post along similar lines to Barry’s comment: Your mission, soldier: dampen speculation that we’re leaving.

  6. Comment by G'Kar
    May 12, 2007 @ 10:29 pm

    It was my impression that under the escalation, there was no longer much of a pretense that we’d be relying on Iraqi forces

    Not really the case. While U.S. forces are taking the lead in the primary areas where the Coalition wants to fight the COIN fight, they are still relying on Iraqi forces in much of the country. Further, in the unlikely event U.S. forces remain for the long term, success will still come down to training Iraqi forces capable of holding cleared areas for the long term so Coalition forces can clear other areas without watching the insurgents move back into the vacated areas as has happened over and over again over the last four years.

    The odds of that plan actually lasting long enough to matter seem too long to consider, however.

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