Auld Acquaintance
Well-done and entertaining profile of the blogosphere’s own Andrew Olmsted, American soldier, in the Rocky Mountain News. Andrew will be blogging more for the paper “starting today” according to the article. His current book recommendation is Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, by Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl. I can’t forbear noting that, anent my post of the other day about the “smart colonels” phenomenon, the London Times book review (quoted on the Amazon page) declared that
. . . General George Casey, the US commander in Iraq, is said to carry it with him everywhere. Most of his staff have been ordered to read it and he pressed a copy into the hands of Donald Rumsfeld when he visited Baghdad in December.
I wish Andrew weren’t going. I’m sure he knows that. I don’t belabor that point in public or private. I hope he returns in good health and good spirits. I will follow his blog with interest and, yes, some worry.
Comment by SomeCallMeTim —
June 22, 2007 @ 8:49 pm
I hope he returns in good health and good spirits. I will follow his blog with interest and, yes, some worry.
Same.
Comment by cfw —
June 23, 2007 @ 9:24 am
Book by Nagl seems to focus on organizational structure as a key variable. If we were more like the Brits were in the Malaya conflict, and less like the US in Viet Nam, we would be ahead of where we are now.
Brits fought with a shoe-string budget in 1948-1960 (as did US in Greece, where insurgents also failed). This suggests a non-corporate approach to long-term low-intensity conflicts in Iraq – win such epic battles with a shoe-string budget over a long term or not at all.
Let the Army of Davids (mostly not US citizens) succeed or fail in places like Iraq.
Either go in with a huge footprint (as in Iraq I) and get out promptly, with limited objectives achieved, or go in with the Army of Davids, and spend 12-25 years to grow a positive result (if possible).
If all the troops we send over to Iraq want to be home in 12-15 months (and want to spend not over 3 tours in Iraq in 7 years), and are not interested in staying for 12-25 years, the insurgents who are quite willing to have each insurgent live and work in Iraq for 12-25 years have the upper hand from a personnel perspective.
The US is learning (again, as in Viet Nam) that the use of advanced equipment to try to make up for a personnel deficiency (less numbers, from far away, each not wanting to live for 12-25 years in the war zone) is not a winner in a long-term low-intensity conflict.
The key variable seems to be – pick the winning team and try not to foul things up. The US could have chosen the Ho side in 1919 and again in 1945. In retrospect, the US and French did not do the right thing – blinded by ideology.
That blindness and misconception of the monolithic communist conspiracy does not get cured by consultants reforming the US Army and setting up schools in Iraq to teach how to fight insurgents.
Having the US employ a large-scale General Electric/McKenzie approach to heavy US troop involvement in a long-term low-intensity conflict seems like a non-starter, because it is too “corporate” and “large footprint” for a long-term engagement.
If the model is a 12-25 year engagement, it needs to be using an Army of Davids approach – mostly natives with limited US backing. The supported entities operate as “start ups” on shoe-string budgets (as in Greece and Malaysia).
(I am not a big fan of the G Reynolds blog or his book – but I do think the Army of Davids idea makes sense for how to deal from afar with a long-term low-intensity conflict.)
Comment by Nell —
June 23, 2007 @ 9:59 am
I thought Andrew had deployed more than a month ago…
Comment by Jim Henley —
June 23, 2007 @ 10:02 am
Nell, me too. I assume that’s the usual “hurry up and wait.”
Comment by Gene Callahan —
June 23, 2007 @ 5:21 pm
“anent my post of the other day”
Jim, I been puzzlin’ and puzzlin’ over this, but I just can’t see what them tree guys from Lord of the Rings has to do with your post.