Question of the Day
Comes from publius at Obsidian Wings: Has “snubbing” ever worked in international relations? The most compelling example offered in the discussion thread is South Africa. I’m willing to hear contraries on that one, but assuming it holds up, one success in generations of UN-era diplomacy fails to compel. Lybia, from the Lockerbie trials forward, might be a second. The high-profile failures – Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Vietnam – seem to bulk larger.
Comment by Jon H —
July 15, 2007 @ 1:12 pm
And it’s even less likely to work now with cash-rich China there to welcome the snubbed parties with open arms.
Comment by Neel Krishnaswami —
July 15, 2007 @ 1:47 pm
Suppose that you’re within a country’s elite, and you have a belligerent idiot wing who want to engage in violence and other provocations, and for whatever reason they’re an important swing constituency. Then, snubbing can be a useful way of not doing anything irreversibly stupid while still placating the nuts. Or, conversely, if you’re one of the nuts, it can be salami tactics to edge a country towards war.
But either way, it’s a tactic determined by domestic politics, not foreign.
Comment by jim —
July 15, 2007 @ 2:43 pm
I’m not sure you can count getting the wrong guy convicted for Lockerbie as a success.
I does seem to me that a problem with snubbing is you have no way of evaluating proffers of cooperation if and when you elicit them.
Comment by Eric Martin —
July 15, 2007 @ 5:59 pm
Lybia, from the Lockerbie trials forward, might be a second.
Depends on what you mean by snubbing in this context. We imposed sanctions on Libya, but held ongoing negotiations about getting those sancsions lifted and what it would take from each party (and the Brits), to normalize relations.
Discussions began under Bush I, continued through Clinton and then to Bush II (although when Bolton was involved early on, he – in typical fashion – proved to be an obstacle when he wasn’t being flat out counterproductive.)
Comment by Nell —
July 15, 2007 @ 5:59 pm
Haven’t delved into the ObWi thread yet, but there’s one major difference between the South Africa case and all the others: a mass movement that spoke for the vast majority of people in the country explicitly supported (and organized for) the international snubbing, starting with the sports boycott (which had a huge psychological impact on SAfrican whites) and on through the divestment campaigns of the 1980s.
Comment by Michael —
July 15, 2007 @ 7:45 pm
Also haven’t delved into ObWi,but I hope the discussion has some measurable definition of “worked” to bring to the table. Did sanctions against Iraq work? Depends, do you mean ‘did they keep Hussein from getting WMDs?’ or ‘did they topple the Hussein government and replace it with the peaceful reign of Jefe-for-life Jeff Spicoli?’
I think the answer to this question will always be whatever the person answering wants it to be.
Comment by Gary Farber —
July 15, 2007 @ 8:25 pm
I declined to participate in that thread because I found some of the assumptions off in a way partially described by the commenter “count cant.”
But I would note that, in regard to “the high-profile failures – Cuba, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Vietnam – seem to bulk larger,” that it may be worth distinguishing between the different goals attempted. Certainly I don’t recall anyone ever suggesting that the government of Vietnam was going to fall because of the US lack of relations with it for many years, ; neither do I recall expectations that the Assad government would fall because of our limited sanctions on Syria; for instance; I may have missed such assertions, to be sure.
Attempting to coerce a certain response, and attempting to overthrow a government, through sanctions, though, are significantly different goals, and I’m unclear that one such failure is similar enough to such a different sort of failure to be usefully compared, or that lumping all such “snubbing” together is a altogether useful exercise in analysis.
It certainly seems fair to say that overthrowing a government by economic sanction is highly difficult, unusual, and unlikely, at best, and that successful sanctions to coerce behavior changes are only mildly less difficult, unusual, and unlikely to succeed.
On the other hand, when looking at lesser cases, the WTO pretty much exists to sporadically sanction countries.
Comment by Brian —
July 16, 2007 @ 1:13 pm
Heck, Neel, are you perhaps talking about a particularly large, well-armed North American nation state?