The Last Thing They Wanted to Do Was Have All This Happen in Secret . . .
Tom Englehardt’s magisterial review of the Bush Administration’s compulsive documentation of its own war crimes needs to be read in its entirety. Maybe the most intriguing byway of the lengthy article is the section on “Article 98 agreements.” About these it must be said, this one of a hundred events of the last six years that tie both parties and all institutions of government to the rot. Englehardt:
“[T]hen-Undersecretary of State John R. Bolton nullified the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court treaty one month into President Bush’s first term” and Congress subsequently passed the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act which prohibited “certain types of military aid to countries that have signed on to the International Criminal Court but have not signed a separate accord with the United States, called an Article 98 agreement.” The Bush administration, opposed to international “fora” of all sorts, then proceeded to go individually, repeatedly, and over years, to more than 100 countries, demanding that the representatives of each sign such an agreement “not to surrender American citizens to the international court without the consent of officials in Washington.”
In other words, they put the sort of effort that might normally have gone into establishing an international agreement into threatening weak countries with the loss of U.S. aid in order to give themselves – and of course those lower-level soldiers and operatives on whom so much is blamed – a free pass for crimes yet to be committed (but which they obviously felt they would commit).
Always the press reports stress these agreements as protecting “the troops,” but the agreements themselves are written to immunize the most powerful officials in government. (See also a contemporaneous BBC News report on suspension of military aid to Colombia. Yeah, I know: silver linings. But they worked it out.)
That’s only part of the whole story, though. Read the rest.
Comment by Mr. Obscura —
October 21, 2007 @ 1:06 pm
Totalitarian regimes do two things really well: make the trains run on time and keep good records.
Though I think you’re right that in this case the records are immunization vehicles.
Comment by Happy Jack —
October 21, 2007 @ 4:30 pm
That’s only part of the whole story, though.
I would also add, intimidation and control. As an example, we know al Qaeda has terror training camps in Pakistan. The security apparatus can’t be sure who’s attending or funding these camps. The government doesn’t want to take the step of denying travel around the world, what can they do? Leak about torture.
Say you’re a Pakistani immigrant, and you’re planning on visiting back home. If you’re ignorant of being watched, you go about your business. However, if you’re aware of an Arar situation, you might have second thoughts about if you go and who you talk to if you do go. Hell, Arar isn’t even an American, but I’d bet he’s leery of traveling now.
In Soviet times, Lubyanka and the gulag weren’t exactly state secrets, and the Soviets were a police state. I understand that Stalin destroyed a number of churches around Lubyanka, so as not to spoil the view and drive the point home.
Comment by Thoreau —
October 21, 2007 @ 5:15 pm
Now here’s the question: If these incriminating documents sit there on the public record, and if we do nothing in response, are we complicit in these crimes? How will history judge us? How will the rest of the world judge us? How should we judge ourselves?
Comment by Jackmormon —
October 21, 2007 @ 7:10 pm
What was the nickname for that act at the time? Wasn’t it the “The Hague Invasion Act”?
Comment by Gary Farber —
October 21, 2007 @ 9:26 pm
“Totalitarian regimes do two things really well: make the trains run on time”
Yeah, that’s a complete crock.
Comment by Gary Farber —
October 21, 2007 @ 9:31 pm
More:
As they say, read the whole thing.
It would be awfully nice if people who aren’t actual fascists would quit buying into this fascist mythology, and promulgating it.
As a general rule, it’s generally a good idea to, if one isn’t seriously familiar with an historical issue/period/area, not go with a cliche: they usually turn out not to be true, at best.
Comment by Mr. Obscura —
October 22, 2007 @ 8:30 am
It actually makes no difference to me whether or not the fascists made the trains run on time. My comment was intended to be, as they say, ironic. I am just bad at humor. My apologies for getting your dander up. Let me try it this way:
It would be awfully nice if people on the intertubes stopped over-reacting. As a general rule, it is a good idea to try to determine the intent of a comment before reacting to it.
Comment by Misanthrope —
October 22, 2007 @ 7:58 pm
- A slight correction to the linked article: “then proceeded to go individually, repeatedly, and over years, to more than 100 countries, demanding that the representatives of each sign such an agreement”. No. We were “succesful” with 100 countries, we “proceeded to go” to far more than that. A number simply turned us down.
- The entire process, ASPA and Article 98s, has been worse than counterproductive. From an international PR standpoint, we look like bulling bufoons and have assured our critics that their worst suspicions are correct. Additionaly, a key portion of the sanctioned military assistance, up until this year, was education and training of senior foreign miltary personnel in US military schools. By removing this training, we denied ourselves the opportunity to build life long relationships with future military leaders, and to positively influence their attitudes towards the US.
- The sanctions were often completely ineffective, particularly in Latin America. In many of these countries the military has little if any influence over international treaties. In several of them, the current political powers would actually prefer less contact between the US military and their own.
- Google the term “ASPA Sanctions” and look at the range of criticism. Active duty generals in charge of implementing ASPA are testifying before congress as to what a bad idea it was. And yet we press on.